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on the proper procedure for the task . This was deemed ample evidence to support the district 
court's decision to apportion Jauch with 50% of the fault. Additionally, the court stated that the 
district court was in a better position to assess the relative degree of fault between the parties. 
The court, due to the evidence presented and its position to weigh the facts, found that there had 
not been clear error. The district court's reduction in Jauch's damages because of his 
contributory negligence was correct. 
The defendant claims that allowing Jauch to recover past medical expenses under the 
pretense of special damages rather than cure would allow him to get through the back door where 
what he could not get through the front door. However, the court fmds that the plaintiff's 
entitlement to recover under the Jones Act for past medical expenses is not barred when he 
cannot recover under cure. The calculation used by the district court to award Jauch only a 
portion of the damages he was entitled to under the Jones Act is unexplainable . Likewise, 
prejudgment interest can be held for Jones Act cases tried in admiralty but is not automatic . City 
of Milwaukee v. Cement Div. , Nat. Gypsum Co. , 5 15 U.S. 189, 196 1 15 S.Ct. 209 1, 132 L.Ed.2d 
148 ( 1995). The ·court did not give a t:eason for denying prejudgment inte:rest. . The judgment for 
the amount of past medical benefits paid by Jauch and the denial of prejudgment interest are 
vacated and remanded. 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision was affirmed insofar as Jauch's 
claim for maintenance and cure and apportioning fault equally and vacated and remanded with 
regard to past medical expenses and the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Kristopher R. Olin 
Class of 2009 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HEREIN, UNDER CIMLA, A PREFERRED SIDP 
MORTGAGE IS SUPERIOR TO BUNKER SUPPLY NONLIENS 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed 
in part, and remanded when it found that any possible lien bunker supplier, 
in relation to its claims against the vessel, were subordinate to the banks' 
preferred ship mortgage but also that the district court erred and abused its 
discretion when it dismissed with prejudice, the supplier's in personam 
claim. 
Dresdner Bank AG v.  MIV Olympia Voyager 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
463 F.3d 1233 
(Decided September 8, 2006) 
Plaintiff, Eko-Elda Anonymi Viomichaniki, Emporiki Eteria Petrelajoeidon 
Viomichaniki (Eko-Elda), supplied bunkers to the MIV OLYMPIA VOYAGER (''the Vessel"). 
Plaintiffs, Dresdner Bank AG in Hamburg, Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau, and Norddeutsche 
Landesbank-Girozentrale (''the banks") brought an action to foreclose on a lien on the Vessel 
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when it defaulted on its preferred ship mortgage payments.  Eko-Elda intervenes in an attempt to 
enforce a lien on the vessel which was in debt to Eko-Elda in the amount of $5.5 million dollars 
for bunkers sold to it. 
The Banks brought suit in rem against the vessel and in personam against Olympic World 
Cruises ("OWC"). While the banks were entitled to foreclose on the defaulted preferred ship 
mortgage, Eko-Elda intervened. Eko-Elda had contracted with OWC to provide bunkers to the 
Vessel, a Greek flagged ship. When the Vessel defaulted in payments to Eko-Elda, Eko-Elda 
warned that they would cease supplies of the bunkers. Royal Olympic Lines, Inc and/or Royal 
Olympia Cruises ("ROC") promised to repay the debt as long as the supply continued. 
O WC filed for bankruptcy and then the Banks began the foreclosure proceedings and 
were awarded final judgment . Eko-Elda then filed a motion to intervene in the district court, and 
that motion was granted. Eko-Elda brought a claim for breach of contract in personam against 
OWC and fraud in rem against the vessel claiming that ROC never actually intended to repay the 
debt owed to Eko-Elda. 
The district court found, and both parties agreed that Greek law applied to Eko-Elda's 
claims. However, because Greek law applied, Eko-Elda was unable to establish any maritime 
lien against the Vessel . Thus, the district court found that the judgment that Eko-Elda would get 
would be subservient to the lien on the preferred mortgage which the Banks had and the district 
court dismissed the claim. 
Eko-Elda claims that the Banks lack ability to defend the Vessel because they didn't file 
a verified statement in accordance with Supplemental Rule C ( 6) (b). The Banks defend that 
even if Eko-Elda had a valid in rem claim it would be subordinate to their lien. Eko-Elda 
requested from the court that if their argument in regards to Rule C didn't work, that the court 
then switch the claim to Supplemental Rule B.  
The court recognizes that in the spirit of Rule C ( 6) (b), the Banks need not file a verified 
statement because they have already filed suit and what Eko-Elda is requesting would just be 
tedious extra work which would provide no more information to any party involved. By their 
initial complaint, the Banks fulfilled the requirement of a verified statement . 
Eko-Elda claims that Greek law would allow a lien which would give it priority over the 
Banks' preferred ship mortgage lien. However, this argument fails because any non-maritime 
lien will always be subordinate to a preferred ship mortgage lien. Greek law says that the laws 
where the Vessel was arrested will govern the ranking of liens, and because the Vessel was 
arrested in the United States, then United States law determines the priority. Furthermore, the 
Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act ( "CIMLA "), 46 U.S .C .  § 31301 et seq., states a 
"preferred mortgage lien . .  . has priority over all claims against the vessel (except for expenses 
and fees allowed by the court, costs imposed by the court, and preferred maritime liens) . "  46 
u.s.c. § 31326(b)(1). 
Greek law cannot determine that any lien that Eko-Elda has is a maritime lien and thus 
United States law gi'ves priority to the Banks' lien and it is determined that the district court was 
correct in dismissing the claims. Eko-Elda's attempt to switch its claim from Supplemental Rule 
C to Supplemental Rule B does not help -its case at all . In order for Eko-Elda's lien to rank 
higher than the Banks' lien, it must be a maritime lien, and Supplemental Rule B does not 
provide a maritime lien, rather an in personam lien claim. Further, evidence that the Banks 
allowed a postponement in mortgage payments did not constitute a fraud or provide equitable 
subordination of the Banks' preferred ship mortgage. 
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However, on Eko-Elda's fmal in personam claim against OWC for breach of contract, it 
was found that the district court erred in dismissing the claim. owe should not have been 
considered a party subject to the district court's jurisdiction and thus the district court abused its 
discretion. 
It is thus established that Eko-Elda has no possible claim for recovery in either 
Supplemental Rule B or C because it cannot establish a maritime lien. However, Eko-Elda's 
claim for breach of contract in personam against OWC is valid and should be reversed. 
Lee D. Soffer 
Class of 2009 
RECOVERY OF OVERHEAD COSTS UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 576 PERMITTED 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, holding 
that that overhead costs claimed by the Army Corp of Engineers, related to 
repairs made to a lock and gate damaged in allision, were "sufficiently 
related" to the work, justifying the awarding of overhead costs. The Court of 
Appeals also held that the District Court was correct in finding that the 
amount of overhead awarded was reasonable. 
United States v. Capital Sand Co., Inc. 
United States Court of Appeals for the gth Circuit 
466 F .3d 655 
(Decided October 25, 2006) 
The MN JAMIE LEIGH, owned by defendant, struck miter gate number two of Lock 25 
on the Mississippi River, while towing a barge, damaging the gate . Lock 25 is maintained and 
operated by the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). 
In order to repair a miter gate, the damaged gate must be pulled from a lock and replaced 
temporarily until the permanent gate can be repaired and reinstalled. The Corps made the repairs 
itself and simultaneously repaired miter gate one, which had previously been damaged in an 
allision in 1999, although repair to this gate was not an urgent issue . After repairs were 
completed on February 9, 2002, the Corps apportioned repairs costs: the Corps estimated the 
damage done to gate two by the defendants to be between $350,000 and $600,000. It was 
decided by the Government that the defendant owed $303,5 1 1.53 . When the defendant did not 
make any payments after receiving a bill, the Government filed suit in the Southern District of 
Illinois . The case was then transferred to the Eastern District of Missouri at defendant's request. 
The Government then recalculated the damages in accordance with the rule of United States v. 
Am. Commercial Barge & Line Co. ,  No. 88-1793-C-7, slip op. at 19 (E .D.Mo. Sept. 30, 199 1), 
a.ff'd in part on other grounds, 988 F .2d 860 (8th Cir . 1993), which requires that damages be 
apportioned in accordance with the repairs that were actually needed and which were caused by 
the specific allision (not including damages resulting from other sources or everyday wear). 
- 17 -
